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The IRS under Siege
In September 1997, Senator William Roth (R, Delaware) opened Senate 
hearings on alleged misconduct at the IRS by announcing his outrage at 
what the Committee had uncovered during its investigation of the agency. 
“Over the course of the next days,” he said, “we are going to see a picture 
of a troubled agency, one that is losing the confidence of the American 
people, and one that all too frequently acts as if it were above the law. 
This is unacceptable.”1
The hearings painted a portrait of a powerful agency run amok. Sena-
tors heard from various taxpayers about abuses they claimed to have 
suffered at the hands of the agency. John Colaprete, owner of The Jewish 
Mother, a restaurant in Virginia Beach, testified that the IRS had con- 
ducted an armed nighttime raid on his home, tearing the door from its 
hinges, ransacking his house, and impounding his safe, his tax return rec-
ords, even his dogs. During a simultaneous raid on his business manager’s 
house, the manager was pulled from the shower at gunpoint and forcibly 
restrained as he tried to call his lawyer. The manager’s teenage son was 
knocked to the floor and his fourteen-year-old daughter was forced to un-
dress in full view of several male agents. According to Colaprete, the IRS 
had instigated the raid, during which it expected to find narcotics, based 
solely on a tip from his ex-bookkeeper, a convicted embezzler and thief, 
after an investigation that lasted less than forty-eight hours. “I used to 
believe that such things could only happen in a communistic bloc country 
or police state,” Colaprete observed. “I do not believe that any more.”2
A year after the hearings took place, it was clear that the most serious 
charges against the agency were grossly exaggerated and, in many cases, 
simply false. When the General Accounting Office (GAO) and other agen-
cies subsequently conducted in-depth investigations, they were unable to 
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substantiate any of the more egregious allegations of IRS abuse.3 Cola-
prete brought a $20 million lawsuit against the agents who raided his 
business, but the case collapsed when several credible witnesses contra-
dicted his account. His own lawyer explained that “over time the more 
you go over [an unpleasant experience] in your mind, the worse it may 
have been.”4 By the time a more balanced appraisal emerged, however, 
Colaprete’s story and others like it had demonized the agency in the public 
eye.
The Senate hearings both reflected and contributed to the fact that the 
IRS was a beleaguered institution in the 1990s. Antitax sentiment had 
gained powerful legitimacy with Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980. When 
both Reagan and George H. W. Bush supported tax increases during their 
presidencies to reduce the federal deficit, proponents of tax cuts were 
radicalized by a sense of betrayal. They began to focus single-mindedly 
on pursuing tax cuts regardless of their impact on the federal budget or 
federal spending programs. Unlike previous conservatives, they were will-
ing to tolerate high federal deficits as the price for reining in government 
by limiting its revenues.
Remarks by two Republican congressmen reflect the extent to which 
ardent hostility to taxes had entered the mainstream by the 1990s. During 
the midterm election campaign of 1994, Representative Bill Archer (R, 
Texas), who would become chair of the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee in 1995, declared, “I personally would like to tear the income tax out 
by its roots and throw it overboard.”5 In 1995, John Kasich (R, Ohio), the 
Budget Committee chair in the House, said in connection with a discus-
sion of the flat tax proposal that “the end game here is to strip the govern-
ment of the financial means for butting into the lives of Americans, and 
thus returning power and responsibility to families and localities.”6 As the 
agency charged with federal tax collection, the IRS was a natural target of 
intense criticism and hostility.
The agency was also struggling to modernize its efforts to collect 
taxes and detect tax evasion. The IRS was and is one of the biggest fi-
nancial institutions in the world. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
it was collecting nearly $2 trillion a year from nearly one hundred and 
thirty million individual and business taxpayers.7 Financial audits con-
ducted by the General Accounting Office beginning in 1992 revealed that 
the agency’s accounting and financial control systems were in shambles. 
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In its first audit, the GAO found that the IRS could not account for $4.3 
billion in agency spending.8 During the following years, accounting fail-
ures continued to plague the agency. In 1998, the GAO found “pervasive 
weaknesses” in the IRS’s financial management systems that prevented 
it from reliably reporting on how it spent its budget.9 In a review of IRS 
collection procedures a year later, the GAO described widespread prob-
lems that “resulted in disbursements of fraudulent and other questionable 
tax refunds, unnecessary burden to taxpayers resulting from taxpayer re-
ceipts stolen by IRS employees, and errors or delays in posting payments 
to taxpayer accounts.”10 Taxpayers were required to keep careful track of 
their income, capital gains, deductions, and credits, yet the IRS could not 
account fully for the nearly $2 trillion it collected every year.11
In the 1990s, the IRS labored under the weight of both political hos-
tility and its own inefficiencies and operational failures. Meanwhile, tax 
professionals at accounting firms, law firms, and financial institutions 
had started working together to create a set of sophisticated transactions 
that had the potential to eliminate billions of dollars in taxes owed by 
wealthy individuals. The IRS, constrained by limited resources and pre-
occupied with ensuring that it was able to perform its basic function of 
collecting taxes, would be slow to identify and respond to these shelters.
The Antitax Crusade
Resentment of taxes is not a new phenomenon in American politics. The 
founding of this nation was the culmination of events that included re-
sistance to taxes. It is only in recent decades, however that taxes have be-
come a central topic in the political conversation. Historian Isaac William 
Martin observes, “Our national obsession with tax cuts is not a timeless 
cultural trait. It is a new political development.”12 It may be hard to be-
lieve in the twenty-first century, but in the three decades after World War 
II politicians rarely fought over taxes, and the public paid little attention 
to tax policy when casting votes. By the late 1970s, however, taxes be-
came a more salient concern for a larger portion of the electorate.
A significant impetus for this shift in attitudes was a change in how 
property taxes were assessed at the local government level. A set of infor-
mal practices historically had resulted in the assessment of property at a 
fraction of its value. This buffered citizens, especially homeowners, from 
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the full financial effect of increases in property value due to inflation and 
economic growth. In the 1970s, however, state officials took steps to end 
this system to centralize and standardize property tax assessment, depriv-
ing “local assessors of the discretion that they had used to grant informal 
privileges.”13
Assessments based on the full market value of property resulted in 
significant property tax increases for many homeowners. This prompted 
a backlash that helped create a political movement focused on reducing 
taxes. The most prominent early success in this effort was the passage of 
Proposition 13 in California in 1978, which amended the state constitu-
tion to sharply limit increases in property taxes. This measure prompted a 
host of initiatives across the country that aimed to limit taxes and spend-
ing, supported not only by those concerned about tax rates but also by 
conservatives who hoped to limit the scope of government. The success of 
these campaigns in turn influenced electoral politics, as many politicians 
concluded that “big tax cuts were good politics.”14 The “permanent tax 
revolt” was born.
The tax revolt gained significant momentum as part of a backlash 
against the civil rights movement, affirmative action, and their association 
with the expansion of government benefits for minorities, particularly Af-
rican Americans. As Tom Edsall and Mary Edsall have shown, the battle 
over Proposition 13 reflected a deep racial divide. For whites, who sup-
ported the referendum by a margin of two to one, property taxes became 
connected with busing decrees, racial preferences in hiring, and a slew 
of entitlements, supported by taxes, whose main beneficiaries appeared 
to be blacks. The tax revolt mapped a division “along lines of taxpayers 
versus tax recipients” that coincided with racial divisions. African Ameri-
cans were “disproportionately the recipients of government programs for 
the poor, disproportionately the beneficiaries of government led efforts to 
redistribute rights and status, and the black middle and working classes 
were far more dependent on government programs and jobs than their 
white counterparts.”15 The antitax movement provided a compelling logic 
around which the conservative movement could mobilize white populist 
sentiment against the liberal agenda that was successfully advanced by 
the Democratic Party in the 1960s and 1970s.16
Among the politicians who seized on reducing taxes was the then gov-
ernor of California Ronald Reagan. Reagan made tax cuts a central part 
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of his 1980 presidential campaign, a position that survey data indi- 
cated resonated with a large portion of voters. As political scientists Jacob 
Hacker and Paul Pierson suggest, “[a]lthough it is hazardous to speak 
of elections producing mandates for specific policy initiatives, it seems 
appropriate to consider the 1980 election results a mandate for lower 
taxes.”17 Reagan came into office with the desire to cut taxes across the 
board by 10 percent every year for three years. The Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 cut the top marginal rate of the personal income tax 
from 70 percent to 50 percent, indexed personal income tax rates to pro-
tect against tax increases reflecting inflation, and provided deep rate cuts 
and tax benefits for corporations.18
Ultimately, Reagan’s tax-cutting fervor collided with his and other 
conservatives’ concerns about fiscal prudence and the federal deficit. The 
1981 cuts and an economic recession increased the deficit, and the Rea-
gan administration’s desired increases in defense spending threatened to 
widen it considerably more. In response, Reagan supported 1982 legisla-
tion that rolled back corporate tax breaks and imposed new excise taxes. 
In 1984, the administration again supported tax increases as a response to 
concerns about a mounting deficit. A comprehensive tax bill, the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, reduced tax rates but also eliminated many deductions, 
resulting in a revenue-neutral impact. As a consequence, while Reagan’s 
election made tax cutting a mainstream political issue, antitax forces were 
disappointed overall with his administration’s unwillingness to make tax 
cuts a priority that trumped other considerations.
That disappointment boiled over into outright revolt when President 
George H. W. Bush in 1990 reneged on his earlier pledge—captured in 
his infamous phrase “read my lips”—not to raise taxes. Bush supported 
tax increases as part of a budget package that was designed to address 
the growing federal deficit. In response, Representative Newt Gingrich 
(R, Georgia) and his allies persuaded more than half the Republicans in 
the House to oppose their party’s ostensible leader. While Bush ultimately 
obtained passage of a package that included tax increases, the conflict 
marked the beginning of intensified conservative focus on tax cuts re-
gardless of their fiscal consequences. As Hacker and Pierson observe, “the 
new-line Republicans reversed the priority between fiscal conservatism 
and tax cuts. For this generation of politicians, reducing taxes was abso-
lutely central.”19
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The intensity with which Republicans pursued this mission was re-
flected in the party’s response to President Clinton’s proposal in 1993 to 
confront the deficit by passing a budget that included a combination of 
tax increases and spending cuts. His plan received not a single Republi-
can vote in the House or the Senate, the first time in modern history that 
a federal budget passed without any support from the minority party. 
When Republicans regained control of the House in the 1994 elections, 
they claimed that it was a mandate to implement the policies set forth in 
the Contract with America, a set of principles that Gingrich had played 
a prominent role in developing. The Contract pledged to bring about 
changes that would result in “the end of government that is too big, too 
intrusive, and too easy with the public's money.” It promised that Repub-
licans on the first day of the next Congress would “immediately pass” 
eight major reforms, including the requirement of “a three-fifths majority 
vote to pass a tax increase.”20
The Republicans made no secret of their agenda to eliminate the in-
come tax.21 In 1996, the House voted to repeal it. Without an alternative 
method to collect revenue, the measure did not get very far in the Senate.22 
A year later, Congressmen Dick Armey (R, Texas) and Bill Tauzin (R, 
Louisiana) launched a “Scrap the Code” tour. The two traveled to several 
cities to speak at anti-income tax rallies, attracting crowds numbering in 
the thousands.23
The single-minded focus on tax cuts was further reflected in the growing 
prominence of Grover Norquist’s organization, Americans for Tax Reform 
(ATR). The roots of the organization lay within the Reagan administra-
tion, with a White House effort headed by Norquist to generate support 
for the 1986 tax legislation. The centerpiece of ATR’s strategy was the Tax-
payer Pledge that it asked all candidates for Congress to sign. Candidates 
promised to “oppose any and all efforts to increase the marginal tax rates 
for individuals and/or businesses,” and to “oppose any net reduction or 
elimination of deductions and credits, unless matched dollar for dollar by 
further reducing tax rates.”24 Over time, signing the pledge became a fun-
damental requirement for a growing percentage of Republican politicians.
The broader aim of the antitax crusade was to shrink government to a 
size where, in Norquist’s words, it could be “drowned in a bathtub.” The 
IRS was a prime target for this campaign. Its difficulties in performing its 
most basic functions reinforced this resentment toward the agency and fu-
eled the growing belief that the tax system was arbitrary and unjustified.
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The Tax Collection Dinosaur
It was not as if operations were running smoothly at the Internal Revenue 
Service in the 1990s. A big source of the problem was the agency’s in-
ability to upgrade its data collection and analysis systems. Through most 
of the last decade of the twentieth century, the agency still relied almost 
exclusively on paper returns to obtain taxpayer information.25 During 
tax season, thousands of employees visually scanned more than a hun-
dred million returns, looking for obvious errors. Other employees, hired 
seasonally by the IRS, typed hurriedly around the clock to input data 
from forms into the IRS computer system.26 With so many returns be-
ing processed at breakneck speed, mistakes were inevitable.27 One study 
showed a 20 percent error rate in the IRS’s data, half of which was at-
tributable to the transcription process.28 It didn’t help that the agency was 
using software from the 1960s, storing taxpayer information on magnetic 
tapes.29 Data transcription was charged by the line to the IRS unit seeking 
the information, creating an incentive to capture less rather than more 
information.30 Although Congress made piecemeal allocations to various 
IRS projects to modernize its computers and establish an electronic filing 
system, the funds were not enough to permit the agency to hire top-flight 
information technology expertise. The result was several failed efforts to 
computerize, a total of $4 billion gone to waste, and a huge public embar-
rassment for the IRS.31
So much money was consumed transporting, unloading, transcribing, 
sorting, filing, and storing paper returns that the IRS had few resources 
left to analyze the data it did obtain.32 As a result, the methodology it 
used to identify suspect returns was simplistic and outdated. To determine 
which returns to scrutinize more closely, the IRS used a rudimentary sta-
tistical method that analyzed the relationships among amounts entered 
on a return and compared those numbers to returns with similar incomes. 
This technique was developed based on large-scale comprehensive audits 
of taxpayers that were intended to identify indicators of inflated deduc-
tions, understated income, and other methods of tax evasion. The last 
time the IRS had conducted such a study was in 1988.33 When the IRS 
sought funding to update its data in 1995, Congress refused to allocate 
the $400 million it requested.34
For obvious reasons, the IRS kept the methods it used to identify ques-
tionable returns secret, but the technique was so crude that a statistician 
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figured out which factors functioned as red flags by conducting regression 
analyses on a sample of returns, comparing those that had been selected 
for audit with those that had not. The statistician, author of How to Beat 
the I.R.S. at Its Own Game, advised taxpayers claiming large deductions 
that they could avoid being audited by doing things such as including an 
explanation of the deductions on the return and writing neatly.35
The difficulty of verifying the accuracy of taxpayer filings was espe- 
cially acute when it came to returns from high-wealth individuals and busi-
nesses. Salaried employees in the United States are subject to mandatory 
withholding of income tax. They also fall under a third-party reporting 
regime that constrains their ability to evade taxes: employers report earn-
ings to the IRS, banks report interest earned and mortgage payments, and 
companies report dividends. Taxpayers earning less than a million dollars 
a year derive three-quarters of their income from wages so opportunities 
to fudge numbers are limited. In contrast, corporations and wealthier tax-
payers—typically business owners, landlords, and partnership investors—
have much greater control over how their gains and losses are reported. 
They generate and oversee the information included in partnership and 
other business-related forms, which provides them with much more lee-
way to evade taxes.36 The IRS plan to update data that Congress declined 
to fund in 1995 would have focused on these types of taxpayers.37
Despite the greater opportunities for evasion enjoyed by wealthy tax-
payers and businesses, the IRS could do little with the data it did col-
lect. Congress refused, for instance, to allocate funds to permit the IRS 
to match partnership filings to individual and corporate tax returns. As 
a result, there was no simple mechanism to pull up a partnership return, 
filed under one name and taxpayer identification number, and the cor-
responding individual or corporate return, filed under another name and 
identification number.38 In addition, the design of the original partnership 
returns did not correlate with specific entries on individual and corporate 
returns.39 The agency’s inability to compare the information from these 
returns was especially significant since partnerships were a favored ve-
hicle for the creation of tax shelters.
The difficulty of catching tax evasion among high-wealth individu-
als and businesses was compounded by a significant brain drain at the 
agency during the 1990s. One problem was compensation. The IRS had 
inadequate resources to offer competitive salaries to the experienced and 
highly trained tax professionals that it needed to recreate and untangle 
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the sophisticated transactions that underlie complex returns. Partnership 
returns can run into the hundreds of pages; corporate returns into the 
thousands. IRS salaries were set at 50 percent of salaries in the private 
sector, which made it difficult to attract people with the expertise to ana-
lyze this information effectively. Another issue was the lack of prestige 
connected with employment at the IRS in the 1990s. In an earlier period, 
working at the agency was considered an opportunity for career advance-
ment and a source of professional pride. As the IRS’s failures mounted, 
however, it became increasingly embarrassing to be associated with it.40 
Meanwhile large accounting and law firms were aggressively courting top 
IRS talent to staff their rapidly expanding tax practices.
In the 1990s, the IRS had few resources and even fewer incentives to 
audit wealthy taxpayers. Under a tracking method imposed by Congress, 
the agency’s success was measured in great part by how many cases it 
resolved, not by how much money was brought in by tax collection. As a 
result, agents tended to be concerned more with moving cases through the 
pipeline than with spending time deciphering complex filings that might 
yield more tax revenues. In addition, since 1995, the IRS had been under 
a specific mandate from Congress to focus on audits of poor working 
people who may have improperly claimed the earned income tax credit 
available to taxpayers with income below a certain threshold.41
The agency’s poor performance showed in its audit rates. In the late 
1970s the overall individual audit rate was about 2.5 percent. By 1996, 
it had declined to 1.67 percent, falling below 1 percent in 1999. Partner-
ship returns were audited even less frequently, at a rate of half a percent.42 
Corporations with assets over $100 million, which had been audited in 
1980 at a rate of 77 percent, were audited in 1997 at a rate of 35 per-
cent.43 The overall audit rate for corporations fell by nearly a third, from 
2.9 percent in 1992 to 2.0 percent in 1998.44 In the late 1990s, there was 
as great a likelihood for a person earning less than $25,000 to be audited 
as a person earning more than $100,000.45
Although Congress regularly excoriated the IRS for its inadequacies, 
since the mid-1990s it had denied the agency the resources needed to 
improve performance. Resentment toward the agency and dissatisfaction 
with its operation culminated in the Senate hearings in 1997 and 1998. 
While the hearings revealed shortcomings in the IRS’s operations, they 
mainly provided a highly visible forum for antitax forces to levy sensa-
tional charges about outrageous agency behavior.
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The IRS on Trial
Convening the Senate hearings in the fall of 1997, Senator William Roth 
declared, “There is no other agency in this country that directly touches 
the lives of more Americans, nor is there any agency which strikes more 
fear into their hearts. The threat of an audit, the awesome power of the 
IRS, looms like the Sword of Damocles over the heads of taxpayers. 
As Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, I want to know why. I 
wanted to understand where this fear came from. I wanted to know if it 
was justified.”46
Several IRS agents offered testimony to the Finance Committee that 
described examples of ineptitude and corruption at the agency. Osten-
sibly fearing for their jobs and even their physical safety, they had been 
given permission to testify anonymously, sitting behind screens and with 
their voices electronically altered to prevent identification. Jennifer Long, 
a long-time IRS employee, testified that IRS agents fabricated evidence 
against taxpayers they had targeted. The agency, she said, wanted to 
“stick it to people who couldn’t fight back.” Other witnesses described 
harrowing dealings with the agency that ended in divorce, homelessness, 
and even suicide.47
Congressional leaders decried the IRS’s “SWAT team” raids and “Ge-
stapo-like” tactics.48 The news media grabbed the story and ran with it. 
Sound bites from the proceedings were broadcast on the evening news. 
Hearing witnesses appeared on Sunday morning talk shows to elaborate 
on their horror stories.49 Newsweek even ran a cover article coauthored 
by former IRS Commissioner Fred Goldberg describing how rogue audi-
tors abused taxpayers.50
The IRS’s Criminal Investigation Division (CID) was a prominent fo-
cus in this avalanche of criticism. A year after the last Finance Committee 
hearing, however, an independent commission charged by Congress to 
study the CID concluded that it was “an organization of dedicated, tal-
ented, and hardworking individuals who carry out their law enforcement 
responsibilities in a professional manner.”51 During the testimony, repre-
sentatives of the IRS had sat silently by, limited by statutory confidential-
ity obligations that prohibited the disclosure of taxpayer information and 
concerned that any response to counter the charges against the agency 
would only serve to escalate the accusations.
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The hearings also revealed useful, but much less publicized, informa-
tion about the deleterious impact of insufficient resources and counter-
productive incentives. IRS employees and outside experts testified that 
poor taxpayers “were pursued because their cases were more easily 
brought to a close,” which resulted in better statistics for performance 
reports, “while those with money to fight back sometimes were allowed 
to slip away without paying.”52 In addition, “[p]rocedures were not al-
ways followed, sometimes because of corner cutting to meet productivity 
demands, more often due to lack of training, which was continually cut 
because Congress did not pay for it.”53 There were also complaints that 
“high-level managers took care of friends and made life difficult for those 
they disliked.”54
On May 7, 1998, in a surprising display of bipartisanship, the Senate 
passed the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act by a vote of 97 to 0.55 After 
the bill was reconciled with an earlier House version, President Clinton 
signed it into law that summer. The legislation provided that the IRS’s 
mandate was to restructure and revise its procedures and operations to 
become a more user-friendly agency. The statute also created a new over-
sight board, imposed new reporting obligations on the IRS, and granted 
taxpayers enhanced rights and protections against harassment and other 
misconduct by IRS employees.
The statute, in addition, contained a little-noted section that account-
ing firms had long favored. Riding the anti-IRS momentum, the organized 
accounting profession persuaded Congress to include a provision under 
which communications between taxpayers and tax practitioners, includ-
ing tax accountants, would receive the same confidentiality protection 
as traditionally afforded communications between clients and their law-
yers.56 By expanding the universe of material that tax accountants could 
keep from the IRS, the statutory tax accountant privilege gave accounting 
firms a boost in competing with law firms for tax advice business.
The 1998 IRS Restructuring and Reform Act’s emphasis on greater 
solicitude for taxpayers was consistent with the new IRS Commissioner’s 
agenda. Charles Rossotti, appointed in late 1997, was the founder of a 
successful computer consulting company. He was the first commissioner 
without a tax background, but was regarded as someone who could help 
modernize the agency and improve its relationship with taxpayers. After 
passage of the 1998 Act, Rossotti revised the agency’s mission statement. 
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The stated purpose of the IRS had been “to collect the proper amount of 
tax revenue at the least cost” in a manner “warranting the highest degree 
of public confidence in our integrity and fairness.”57 The revised state-
ment emphasized helping Americans “to understand and meet their tax 
responsibilities.”58 The IRS, mindful both of the need to modernize its 
operations and the beating that it had taken in Senate hearings and in the 
media, was required to put enforcement activities on the back burner, at 
least for the time being.
From Tax Collection to Customer Service
Under Rossotti’s leadership, the IRS initiated a massive restructuring and 
modernization. One hundred thousand employees were reassigned to 
divisions organized according to taxpayer types, retrained on their new 
job obligations, and educated about the importance of customer satis-
faction.59 Simultaneously, the agency began shifting to new computer 
systems to strengthen its information tracking capabilities and expand 
electronic filing mechanisms, an urgent imperative given the technologi-
cal fiascos earlier in the decade.
There was no question that taxpayer service was a widespread prob-
lem. The agency was doing a poor job of educating taxpayers about their 
filing and payment responsibilities and explaining collection procedures. 
One telling statistic: In 1995, taxpayers heard 400 million busy signals 
when they tried to call the IRS. When callers did get through, they often 
encountered employees who did not have sufficient knowledge—or much 
inclination—to assist them.60 Addressing these problems was a priority, 
but it came at significant cost. Despite its new mandate for the agency, 
Congress refused to increase funding. According to one source, the IRS’s 
budget, adjusted for inflation, actually declined 5 percent between 1992 
and 1999, while the number of tax returns and the amount of tax col-
lected grew.61
The reorganization significantly strained agency resources. To assist in 
the restructuring, the IRS hired Booz Allen, a management consulting firm, 
paying it $100 million for its services. A smaller-ticket item was a million-
dollar advertising campaign emphasizing the friendlier tone at the agency.62 
Without new funding, enforcement personnel had to be reassigned to ad-
dress customer service needs. During filing season, for example, many 
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collection employees were shifted to answering taxpayer queries.63 Rev-
enue agents also had to devote many hours to participating in the reor-
ganization process. According to Commissioner Rossotti, a year after the 
IRS Restructuring and Reform Act’s passage, the number of staff available 
for audits and collections was 19 percent lower than in 1997.64
Other provisions in the 1998 bill slowed collection efforts. New pro-
cedures that provided stronger taxpayer rights with regard to levies and 
property seizures made these processes more costly and time consuming. 
Training employees about new procedures took up time and resources. As 
Rossotti testified a year after the act was passed, taxpayer rights provi-
sions required the equivalent of nearly 3,000 person years of staff time 
to comply with procedural requirements.65 Under the statute, the IRS was 
also curtailed from using lifestyle audits—targeting people who appeared 
to be living well beyond their means, at least as they reported on their tax 
returns. These had been a helpful technique to reveal tax evasion among 
high-wealth individuals.66
The 1998 statute’s disabling effects on tax collection were magnified 
by the inclusion of a provision known colloquially as the “Ten Deadly 
Sins,” a list of prohibitions that would result in the dismissal of an IRS 
agent. The list included some clearly serious conduct, such as lying under 
oath; it also included other misconduct—harassing or retaliating against a 
taxpayer—that left broad room for interpretation.67 Under this provision, 
a taxpayer complaint could entangle an employee in a drawn-out process 
in which the employee had to justify her actions or risk losing her job.68 
Appointed to be a watchdog over the agency, the new inspector general 
for tax administration pursued complaints aggressively.69 The benefit of 
complaining about revenue agents was not lost on taxpayers, who began 
to threaten and use complaints to derail the cases against them. A later 
investigation confirmed the widespread use of complaints as a dilatory 
tactic, concluding that nearly 90 percent of those brought in 2001 were 
meritless.70 One group of tax resisters filed nearly 2,000 false misconduct 
complaints against revenue agents as part of a fraudulent scheme to avoid 
paying taxes.71
Given the risks of taking a hard line with recalcitrant taxpayers, the 
best strategy for enforcement agents was to be nice and keep their heads 
down.72 “Don’t aggravate taxpayers,” one agent was instructed by his 
manager. Another was told, “Don’t probe too deeply. Just find three or 
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four items and close the case.”73 Talking to a reporter, one collection agent 
said: “Please don’t call us tax collectors in the newspaper. We don’t collect 
taxes anymore. We aren’t allowed to.”74
The effects showed up in enforcement statistics. In the 1999 fiscal year, 
property seizures dropped 98 percent from the year before.75 Bank ac-
count levies and wage garnishments were at one quarter of the level they 
had been two years earlier.76 In 1999, the overall audit rate for individuals 
was less than 1 percent.77 Face-to-face audits declined by 40 percent.78 At 
the same time, the IRS continued to focus its audits on poorer Americans. 
In 1999, for the first time, taxpayers earning less than $25,000 were more 
likely to be audited than those earning more than $100,000. Since 1988, 
the audit rate for wealthier Americans had fallen 90 percent, from 11.4 
to 1.15 percent.79
During the 1980s, the agency had been perceived as doing an ade-
quate job enforcing the tax laws, but by the late 1990s, it was behind the 
eight ball. Attempting to respond to the difficulties posed by limited re- 
sources, obsolete technology, and new legal constraints, it was unable 
to keep pace with sophisticated new schemes and techniques that might 
emerge to avoid paying taxes. At the same time, agency officials had little 
appetite to engage in aggressive enforcement activity that might risk trig-
gering the type of public denunciation that the IRS had received on Capi-
tol Hill and in the media.
In the meantime, wealthy individuals and corporations—with assis-
tance from large financial institutions, state-of-the-art computer systems, 
and the emerging Internet—were engaging in increasingly complex busi-
ness transactions. The United States was experiencing an economic boom 
that lifted the wealth of corporations and large numbers of entrepreneurs 
to new heights. In the meantime, accounting firms and law firms, un-
der intense competitive pressures, were anxiously seeking to identify new 
sources of revenue. Tax strategies, sold as products to multiple clients, 
offered a new avenue to fuel growth and increase profits. The problem 
was that the profitable strategies were abusive tax shelters—transactions 
resulting in tax benefits that were not recognized under the law.
